Gaza’s devastation, changing public attitudes and growing opposition to arms transfers are challenging a relationship built over generations. The question is whether that shift will reach the machinery of American power.
For decades, Israel could count on something few American allies enjoyed: support that survived changes of president, shifts in congressional control and repeated wars in the Middle East. Military assistance continued, diplomatic protection endured and politicians across the two main parties competed to demonstrate their commitment to the relationship.
That consensus is becoming harder to sustain. Public sympathy has shifted, opposition to particular weapons transfers has spread through the Senate’s Democratic caucus, and the destruction of Gaza has exposed a widening distance between Washington’s established commitments and the views of many Americans.
Gallup’s February 2026 survey captured the change. It found that 41 per cent of Americans sympathised more with Palestinians and 36 per cent with Israelis, reversing the previous year’s figures of 33 and 46 per cent respectively. Gallup cautioned that the five point Palestinian advantage was not statistically significant. The finding nevertheless marked the disappearance of Israel’s longstanding lead in that annual series. Gallup, 27 February 2026
The political consequences remain unsettled. On 15 April, 40 senators supported advancing an attempt to block a bulldozer sale to Israel, while 36 supported advancing a separate measure against a bomb sale. Both motions failed, demonstrating how far opposition had spread within the Democratic caucus and how much protection the existing policy still retained. US Senate, bulldozer vote, US Senate, bomb vote
This tension runs through Channel 4 News’ FourSight report, Why Americans fell out of love with Israel – explained, presented by Kiran Moodley and published on 4 May 2026. Its interviews with historians, political analysts and a former American official describe an alliance whose institutional strength increasingly coexists with public disillusionment. Channel 4 News, original video, 4 May 2026, accompanying reporting
Understanding the scale of the change requires looking beyond the familiar description of an unbreakable bond. The relationship developed through political choices, strategic calculations, religious convictions and organised advocacy, and its present form was never inevitable.
On 14 May 1948, President Harry Truman recognised Israel just eleven minutes after its establishment. The Holocaust, in which six million Jews had been murdered, gave the question of Jewish refuge an overwhelming moral urgency. Domestic politics also mattered: Truman faced a difficult election, and advisers including Clark Clifford argued that support for a Jewish state would help him secure Jewish votes. Secretary of State George Marshall objected to allowing electoral considerations to shape a decision with major international consequences. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, recognition history, Truman Library, domestic political debate
For Palestinians, the same period brought the Nakba, the mass displacement and dispossession that accompanied Israel’s creation and the 1948 war. More than 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes. The American relationship with Israel developed against both of these histories: Jewish survival after European persecution and the catastrophe experienced by Palestinians. United Nations, history of the Nakba
Recognition did not immediately produce the military partnership familiar today. During the 1956 Suez crisis, President Dwight Eisenhower opposed the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France and pressed for withdrawal. The episode demonstrated Washington’s willingness to confront Israel when American leaders believed their interests diverged. US State Department, Suez crisis history
The relationship developed further under John F. Kennedy, whose administration agreed in 1962 to sell Israel Hawk antiaircraft missiles. American officials weighed Israel’s security requirements against the danger of a regional arms race and Soviet influence among Arab states. The sale marked an important step towards a much closer defence relationship. US State Department, 1962 policy memorandum
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war deepened its strategic importance. As University of Maryland professor Shibley Telhami explains in FourSight, Soviet involvement with Arab states expanded, while Israel increasingly relied on American backing. Political analyst Dahlia Scheindlin describes how that security partnership reinforced the claim that the two countries shared democratic values and a common political outlook.
The description of Israel as a democratic ally became central to American political rhetoric, even as its rule over Palestinians exposed the limits and contradictions of that claim. The alliance was sustained through a combination of strategic usefulness and a powerful story about shared identity.
Its material scale is substantial. In an October 2025 assessment, the Council on Foreign Relations put cumulative American assistance to Israel at more than $300 billion when adjusted for inflation, making it the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign assistance. That support helped build a military partnership extending across successive administrations. Council on Foreign Relations, 7 October 2025
Religion added another durable foundation. FourSight traces the development of ties between Israeli leaders and American evangelical Christians, particularly from the late 1970s. For some evangelicals, support for Israel reflects beliefs about biblical prophecy and the second coming of Jesus, making the relationship a matter of religious commitment as well as foreign policy.
The programme presents Mike Huckabee’s outlook as an example of that tradition. It also recalls Joe Biden’s declaration that he was a Zionist, illustrating how support for Israel has crossed denominational and party boundaries. Religious identification and political commitment have reinforced each other, while the beliefs and priorities within those communities remain varied.
Organised lobbying has reinforced those commitments. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, works to sustain support across both parties through lobbying, political backing and grassroots activity. Its own account of its mission stresses American interests and a mutually beneficial partnership, including security assistance and missile defence cooperation. AIPAC, mission and activities
Critics argue that this political infrastructure raises the cost of challenging Israeli policy. In the programme, Harvard international relations scholar Stephen Walt describes the relationship AIPAC seeks to preserve as one of effectively unconditional American support. FourSight also recalls Barack Obama’s acknowledgement in his memoir that AIPAC members were among the important supporters and donors of politicians across Washington, including himself.
AIPAC rejects the characterisation that it operates on behalf of the Israeli government or simply purchases politicians’ loyalty. The dispute concerns the influence of a specific organisation and its political networks, alongside strategic, religious and electoral forces that also shape American policy.
Walt experienced the intensity of that dispute when he and John Mearsheimer published The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy in 2007. Their argument that the relationship had become damaging to American interests provoked fierce criticism, including accusations of antisemitism. “The reaction was ferocious,” he recalls in FourSight, describing a sustained effort to marginalise and discredit them over a subject that had been treated as taboo.
The present debate is taking place in a different public climate, shaped above all by Gaza. The Hamas led attacks of 7 October 2023 killed about 1,200 people in Israel, including foreign nationals, and involved the abduction of hostages into Gaza. The shock initially generated broad sympathy for Israel. As its subsequent military campaign continued, Americans were confronted with the destruction of Palestinian neighbourhoods, repeated displacement and a mounting death toll.
By 29 December 2025, Gaza’s Ministry of Health had reported 71,266 Palestinian fatalities since the war began, according to the UN humanitarian agency OCHA, a total encompassing civilians and combatants. OCHA’s report also described people living in flooded makeshift tents and damaged buildings, alongside restrictions and impediments affecting humanitarian work. OCHA, 30 December 2025
Omer Bartov, the Israeli born genocide scholar and former Israeli soldier interviewed for FourSight, says his assessment hardened as the campaign unfolded. “By May of 2024, it became clear to me it had become a genocidal operation,” he says.
That conclusion extends beyond individual commentators. On 16 September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. Israel rejects the accusation, maintaining that its military operations target Hamas and are conducted in accordance with international law. Separately, the International Court of Justice has issued provisional measures in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel; those orders address protection during the proceedings and do not constitute a final determination of the case. UN commission, 16 September 2025, International Court of Justice, case record
FourSight’s contributors argue that the visibility of Gaza’s destruction has been decisive. Videos from Palestinian journalists and residents brought suffering directly to audiences who might once have encountered the conflict mainly through official statements or television news. Posts by Israeli soldiers also exposed conduct that critics regarded as evidence of cruelty and dehumanisation.
These accounts help explain why the programme’s interviewees see Gaza as a major force in changing attitudes, particularly among younger Americans. The polling establishes that opinion shifted; it does not isolate the precise effect of individual videos, platforms or events. What emerges from the interviews is a growing difficulty in reconciling declarations about shared values with the treatment of Palestinians.
Iran has introduced an additional dispute over American interests and responsibility. The twelve day Israel–Iran war in June 2025 brought American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. A new joint American and Israeli offensive began on 28 February 2026, and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the initial campaign. UK government, Iran security bulletin, March 2026
The chronology matters. Gallup conducted its February survey between 2 and 16 February, before the new offensive began. That war therefore cannot explain the decline already measured in that poll, although the earlier confrontation with Iran and the longer Gaza campaign preceded it. Later polling is needed to assess attitudes after the February offensive. Gallup, survey dates
An NBC News Decision Desk poll reported on 19 April found that 67 per cent of American adults disapproved of Donald Trump’s handling of the Iran war and 33 per cent approved. That was a measure of opinion about Trump’s conduct of the conflict, rather than a direct measure of support for Israel, but it showed the political difficulties facing an administration that had promised to avoid further wars. NBC News report, 19 April 2026
FourSight examines the perception that Benjamin Netanyahu pushed Washington towards confrontation. It cites reporting about his presentations to American officials and includes former secretary of state John Kerry’s account that Netanyahu had advocated strikes to successive presidents. Trump denies that Israel talked him into the war, and the programme notes his own longstanding hostility towards Iran.
The distinction is essential to understanding the policy debate. Israeli advocacy can be scrutinised while responsibility for American military decisions remains with the American officials who authorised them. Claims that Washington was simply compelled to act erase that responsibility and turn a contested explanation into an established fact.
The partisan divide is pronounced. Gallup found that Democrats favoured Palestinians by 65 per cent to 17 per cent, while Republicans favoured Israelis by 70 per cent to 13 per cent. Those differences place politicians from the two parties under sharply different electoral pressures. Gallup, 27 February 2026
On the Democratic side, changing attitudes have begun to alter what politicians are willing to say and how they vote. Zohran Mamdani’s election as New York City mayor in November 2025 provided a prominent example of a candidate succeeding while openly criticising Israeli policy. His victory cannot be reduced to his position on Israel, but it challenged assumptions about the electoral limits of such criticism. Bowdoin College, 5 November 2025
The Senate votes offer a more direct measure of the shift. Two efforts to advance restrictions on arms sales on 3 April 2025 received fifteen votes each. A year later, the comparable April 2026 motions attracted forty votes over bulldozers and thirty six over bombs. These concerned different proposed transfers, but the growth in support was substantial. US Senate, April 2025 first vote, US Senate, April 2025 second vote
The 2026 measures concerned approximately $295 million in bulldozers and $151.8 million in bombs. Their supporters included independents who caucus with Democrats, reflecting how opposition had spread across that broader grouping. Neither measure advanced, leaving the proposed transfers unblocked by those votes. Bernie Sanders’ Senate office, 15 April 2026
Party institutions have moved less decisively. On 9 April 2026, the Democratic National Committee’s resolutions committee rejected a campaign finance resolution specifically targeting AIPAC, while referring proposals on conditioning military aid and recognising Palestinian statehood to a working group. The distinction between rejection and deferral matters, although both outcomes left critics without the immediate commitments they sought. ABC News, 9 April 2026
Former State Department official Karin von Hippel, interviewed at length in FourSight, cautions that the views of the Democratic base and those of established party leaders remain different. She points to discussion by Rahm Emanuel about requiring Israel to pay for support it has traditionally received through grants, suggesting that even longstanding supporters may begin to argue for a more transactional arrangement.
Among Republicans, the programme identifies another combination of pressures. Evangelical commitments, strategic arguments and loyalty to Trump continue to support the relationship, while critics associated with the America First movement question why the United States should become involved in another Middle Eastern war. Their objections can converge with criticism from the left despite having different political and moral starting points.
Such convergence does not establish a shared commitment to Palestinian rights. Opposition to American expenditure or military intervention may coexist with indifference towards Palestinian freedom. Anger over a war also does not necessarily translate into support for restricting Israel’s access to American weapons.
Scheindlin raises a further concern in the programme: criticism of Israeli influence can slide into antisemitic claims that Jews secretly control American decisions. Scrutiny of lobbying, campaign finance and relations between governments is legitimate and necessary. Assigning collective responsibility to Jewish people introduces a different claim, one that endangers people who have no responsibility for the decisions being criticised.
American Jewish opinion itself demonstrates why those distinctions matter. A Washington Post survey conducted in September 2025 found that 39 per cent of Jewish Americans believed Israel had committed genocide in Gaza, while 51 per cent disagreed. At the same time, 76 per cent regarded Israel’s existence as vital to the future of the Jewish people. Attachment to Israel and condemnation of its conduct clearly can coexist. The Times of Israel, reporting the poll, 5 October 2025
The programme also describes the fear generated by violence in the United States. Two Israeli embassy employees were shot dead outside Washington’s Capital Jewish Museum on 21 May 2025. On 1 June, demonstrators in Boulder, Colorado, calling for the release of hostages were attacked with incendiary devices. Federal prosecutors brought charges in both cases. US Justice Department, Washington case, US Justice Department, Boulder case
Scheindlin describes Jewish students who feel held personally responsible for Israeli actions even when they are critical of the government. Those fears can exist alongside anger at the destruction of Gaza. Protecting Jewish people from harassment and violence and defending the right to criticise Israeli state policy are compatible obligations.
The final question is how far the changes described in FourSight will reach. “I’m not entirely sure it’s going to impact policy going forward,” von Hippel says of the shift in opinion. Congress has a central role in funding assistance, while presidents shape diplomacy and the administration of military support. Established relationships can survive substantial public opposition when the officials controlling those decisions remain committed to them.
She also stresses that defence cooperation runs in both directions, with the United States drawing on Israeli weapons development and technology. That interdependence creates incentives for continuity, even if future administrations reconsider grants, attach conditions to transfers or demand clearer financial returns.
The debates could become more prominent in future presidential primaries and elections, particularly as candidates confront the gap between their parties’ voters and their inherited foreign policy positions. A change in Israeli leadership or conduct could also alter the trajectory. None of those outcomes can be read directly from a single poll or a failed Senate motion.
For Palestinians, the decisive measures will be concrete: whether weapons deliveries change, whether humanitarian access is protected, whether diplomatic support is conditioned and whether political rights become an enforceable priority. The erosion of sympathy for Israel does not by itself achieve any of those things.
The alliance still commands powerful institutional support. What has weakened is the assumption that this support will remain politically unquestioned. The next test is whether elected officials respond to the public shift by changing the decisions that sustain the relationship, and whether those changes improve the lives of the people who have borne its consequences.
Original programme credits: Channel 4 News, FourSight, published 4 May 2026.
The programme credits contributions from Omer Bartov, Karin von Hippel, Dahlia Scheindlin, Shibley Telhami and Stephen Walt.