Within hours, a jury acquitted Tony Greenstein of a terrorism offence and a judge refused to treat the Barclays Five as terrorists. The cases exposed the expanding use of counterterrorism law against Palestine campaigners and showed what could be lost when criminal trials are transferred from juries to judges sitting alone.
Two English Crown Courts delivered significant setbacks on 21 August 2026 to attempts to associate Palestine solidarity activism with terrorism.
At Kingston Crown Court, a jury unanimously acquitted veteran Jewish anti Zionist writer Tony Greenstein of inviting support for Hamas through three social media posts published on 7 October 2023.
At Preston Crown Court, Judge Robert Altham ruled that five activists convicted of damaging a Barclays branch in Burnley should not have their offences classified as having a “terrorist connection”.
The outcomes were legally different and must be described accurately. Greenstein was cleared by a jury and left court without a terrorism conviction. The Barclays defendants, known as the Barclays Five rather than the Barclays Four, remain convicted of criminal damage and are due to be sentenced on 4 September.
Their convictions were not overturned. What was defeated was an attempt to transform their criminal damage offences into terrorism linked offending at the sentencing stage, with far more severe consequences.
Nevertheless, the two decisions, delivered within hours of one another, exposed the danger of stretching terrorism legislation far beyond conduct traditionally understood as terrorism. They also created an uncomfortable backdrop to the former Labour government’s attempt to remove the right to jury trial from thousands of defendants.
Tony Greenstein’s terrorism prosecution
Greenstein, 72, was prosecuted under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 over three posts on X linking to his writing about the Hamas led attacks of 7 October 2023.
The prosecution argued that language including “Full support for the Gaza ghetto uprising” amounted to an invitation to support Hamas, which is proscribed in Britain.
Greenstein maintained that he was expressing support for Palestinian resistance to occupation, blockade and military attack, not inviting people to join or support Hamas as a political or religious organisation.
That distinction became the centre of the trial.
Greenstein told the court that he had opposed Hamas politically for years, particularly its religious conservatism and its position on social questions. His defence presented previous articles in which he had criticised Hamas and religious fundamentalism.
The prosecution reportedly accepted that it was not alleging longstanding or wholesale ideological support for Hamas. Its argument was that Greenstein’s words on 7 October crossed the criminal boundary at that particular moment.
Reporting on the evidence described how Greenstein repeatedly differentiated between support for resistance to an occupying military and endorsement of the organisation conducting that resistance. He compared his position to supporting an act carried out by a liberation movement without necessarily accepting the ideology or political programme of every organisation participating in it. The Canary reported on Greenstein’s evidence and the exchanges inside the courtroom.
The trial was marked by sharp confrontations between Greenstein and Judge Sarah Plaschkes KC. When he attempted to discuss the history of Gaza, Israel’s blockade and the political circumstances surrounding his statements, the judge repeatedly intervened and reminded him that the proceedings were not a political forum.
On several occasions, the jury was required to leave the courtroom while arguments took place over what evidence it would be permitted to hear. Judge Plaschkes subsequently disclosed that she had considered contempt proceedings over aspects of Greenstein’s conduct but decided against them.
Despite those restrictions, Greenstein succeeded in placing enough of his political history and intentions before the jurors for them to assess the prosecution’s interpretation of his words.
After deliberating for two hours and 11 minutes, five women and seven men returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty. Greenstein appeared visibly emotional as supporters reacted in the public gallery. Press Association’s account of the acquittal confirmed that he had been cleared of the single terrorism charge.
The verdict did not represent judicial approval of everything Greenstein had written, nor did it change the legal status of Hamas as a proscribed organisation. It established something more precise and constitutionally important: the prosecution failed to make twelve members of the public sure that Greenstein’s words constituted the criminal offence alleged.
Outside court, Greenstein directly connected his acquittal with the debate over jury trials. He argued that a judge sitting alone would almost certainly have convicted him and accused Keir Starmer and David Lammy of wanting fewer juries because ordinary people might reject the state’s interpretation of political speech.
Whether or not one accepts every part of that accusation, his case demonstrates why the identity and independence of the decision maker matter.
The Barclays Five and the £212,805 bank action
The Preston case involved Brendon O’Hagan, 28, Amanda Kelly, 31, Hmeera Atiqnisar, 31, Mohammed Malik, 28, and Alma Yaniv, 70.
The five were convicted in June of causing £212,805.14 worth of damage to the Barclays branch on St James’s Street in Burnley during the early hours of 5 August 2024.
Masked activists carrying hammers broke windows, sprayed red paint across the building, left leaflets about Palestine and filmed the action for public distribution. They said the purpose was to pressure Barclays into withdrawing financial support for the Israeli weapons manufacturer Elbit Systems.
All the defendants except Yaniv were described in court as full members of Palestine Action or closely connected with the organisation. They had attended direct action training, and prosecutors maintained that the Burnley incident formed part of a wider campaign against Barclays over its financial relationship with Elbit.
Palestine Action was not a proscribed organisation when the bank was targeted. It was added to the list of prohibited terrorist organisations in July 2025, almost a year after the incident. At the time of the Burnley action, belonging to or supporting Palestine Action was not a terrorism offence.
After the jury returned its criminal damage verdicts, the five learned that the court was considering whether their offences should be treated as having a terrorist connection under Section 69 of the Sentencing Act.
The defendants said neither they nor the jury had been told during the trial that guilty verdicts could lead to terrorism linked sentencing. Their guilt was therefore decided as an ordinary criminal damage case, while the possibility of converting the convictions into terrorism linked offences emerged only afterwards.
That possibility carried consequences extending far beyond an ordinary criminal damage sentence.
If the terrorism connection had been established, the defendants could have received longer prison terms, lost their right to automatic early release, spent longer periods on licence and become subject to extensive police monitoring and notification requirements after leaving prison.
At Preston Crown Court, Judge Robert Altham accepted that the financial cost of the damage was substantial but concluded that it did not satisfy the high statutory threshold required for a terrorism connection.
He said the court had to consider the nature and sensitivity of the property as well as the monetary value. A commercial bank branch, he concluded, was materially different from a sensitive military or weapons manufacturing facility.
The judge therefore ruled that Section 69 did not apply.
Pete Weatherby KC, representing O’Hagan, argued that the defendants’ conduct was “very far from terrorism” and that “ordinary criminal law is sufficient to cover such convictions”. He warned that a terrorism finding would produce draconian sentences and consequences completely disproportionate to breaking windows and spraying paint.
The BBC report, syndicated by Yahoo News, described approximately 100 supporters cheering and banging drums outside the court after the ruling. The five smiled with relief and were embraced by supporters as they left.
They will still be sentenced for criminal damage on 4 September. The judgment simply prevents those offences from being reclassified as terrorism linked conduct.
Why the distinction matters
The Barclays Five have not been acquitted, and a jury did not overturn terrorism convictions against them. No terrorism charges were placed before their jury.
The jury convicted them of criminal damage. Judge Altham subsequently refused to attach a terrorist connection to those convictions for sentencing purposes.
That distinction is essential because it shows how terrorism findings can be introduced after a jury has completed its work.
Jurors can convict defendants of an ordinary offence without being told that their verdict might later be used as the foundation for a terrorism finding carrying longer imprisonment, reduced release rights and years of monitoring.
The case also demonstrates that ordinary criminal law was entirely capable of dealing with the conduct. Windows were broken, paint was sprayed and more than £212,000 in damage was caused. The defendants were investigated, prosecuted and convicted without needing to describe property damage as terrorism.
The Barclays Five were not the Filton Four
References to the “Barclays Four” appear to confuse the Burnley defendants with four Palestine Action activists convicted over a separate action at an Elbit Systems facility in Filton, near Bristol.
Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, Leona Kamio and Fatema Rajwani were convicted at a retrial of criminal damage arising from an August 2024 raid that caused approximately £1.2 million in damage to equipment and property. Two other defendants, Zoe Rogers and Jordan Devlin, were acquitted of criminal damage.
Corner was also convicted of grievous bodily harm without intent after a police officer was seriously injured during the action. The jury cleared him of the more serious allegation that he intended to cause grievous bodily harm.
At the first trial, a jury acquitted all six defendants of aggravated burglary but could not reach verdicts on the criminal damage counts. Prosecutors pursued a retrial, in which four defendants were convicted and two were cleared.
Mr Justice Jeremy Johnson subsequently ruled that the offences had a terrorist connection, although the four had not been convicted of terrorism charges and the jury had not been told that its criminal damage verdicts could result in terrorism linked sentencing.
Corner was sentenced to seven years and eight months. Head and Kamio received five years each, while Rajwani received four years and eight months. Associated Press reported on the sentences and the judge’s terrorism finding.
The Filton case therefore produced the result prosecutors unsuccessfully sought in the Barclays proceedings. It also exposed the remarkable division of responsibility created by the terrorism connection provisions: a jury can decide whether the ordinary offence has been proved, but a judge can subsequently change the legal character and consequences of that conviction.
Starmer and Lammy’s attempt to restrict jury trials
Against this background, the importance of the Courts and Tribunals Bill becomes difficult to ignore.
The legislation was introduced in February 2026 under Keir Starmer’s government and sponsored by David Lammy, then Justice Secretary. It passed its second reading by 304 votes to 203 following a substantial Labour rebellion and was carried into the next parliamentary session.
The official Parliamentary Bill page currently records the legislation at the Commons report stage.
It would be inaccurate to say that Starmer and Lammy proposed the complete abolition of juries. Murder, rape and other indictable only offences would continue to be tried by juries. Lammy claimed approximately three quarters of Crown Court trials would retain them.
The legislation nevertheless proposed a historic removal of jury choice across a broad range of criminal cases.
Defendants accused of offences that can currently be tried either by magistrates or in the Crown Court would lose the right to elect jury trial. Cases assessed as likely to produce a sentence of three years or less would be transferred to a new Crown Court Bench Division, where one judge would decide the facts, determine guilt and pass sentence.
The judge would retain the Crown Court’s full sentencing powers. A case could therefore be allocated to the juryless division because a sentence below three years was anticipated, but the judge would not ultimately be prohibited from imposing a longer term.
The Bill would also increase magistrates’ sentencing powers, restrict the automatic right to appeal from magistrates’ courts and permit judges to try certain complex financial cases without juries.
The government’s own Courts and Tribunals Bill factsheet confirms that qualifying cases beneath the proposed three year threshold would be heard by a judge alone.
Could Greenstein have lost his jury?
Greenstein’s prosecution illustrates the potential reach of the legislation.
An offence under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act is triable either way. Although the maximum sentence is 14 years, the official guideline provides a one year starting point for lower culpability and lower harm cases, with a range extending from a high level community order to two years’ imprisonment.
The Sentencing Council guideline for supporting a proscribed organisation therefore places some Section 12 prosecutions squarely below the Bill’s three year threshold.
A future case comparable to Greenstein’s could consequently be assigned to a judge sitting alone if the anticipated sentence were three years or less. The defendant would have no right to insist that twelve members of the public decide whether a political statement amounted to criminal support for a proscribed organisation.
That does not prove Greenstein would have been convicted by a judge. It does show that his warning about the jury proposals was not merely rhetorical. The legislation could have removed juries from precisely the kind of politically sensitive, lower culpability terrorism prosecution he faced.
A court system allowed to collapse
Lammy argued that extraordinary reform was necessary because the Crown Court system was approaching collapse.
Nearly 80,000 cases were awaiting resolution, some trials were being scheduled years into the future, and victims were abandoning prosecutions after intolerable delays. Defendants held on remand were spending months or years in prison without being convicted.
These are real injustices. Victims and witnesses are failed when proceedings repeatedly collapse or disappear into an overcrowded court calendar, just as unconvicted defendants are failed when they remain imprisoned while waiting for a trial.
The disputed question was whether juries caused that crisis.
The government estimated that judge only proceedings would be approximately 20 per cent faster. Parliament’s Justice Committee found that the claimed saving lacked a sufficiently concrete evidential basis. It also warned that the proposed allocation system could become complicated and time consuming, producing new hearings and disputes over whether defendants should receive jury trials.
The committee revisited Lammy’s own 2017 review of racial disparities in criminal justice. That review found that juries were among the comparatively few parts of the system in which ethnic minority defendants did not experience disproportionate outcomes.
The committee expressed concern about transferring additional power to a judiciary in which only one per cent of Crown Court judges were Black. Its report on the Courts and Tribunals Bill warned that the racial and equality consequences required much greater examination.
The restrictions on appeals were equally troubling. In 2025, approximately 41 per cent of appeals against magistrates’ court convictions and 46 per cent of appeals against sentences were successful.
The government was proposing to send more serious cases into magistrates’ courts while simultaneously making their errors more difficult to correct.
Starmer and Lammy’s reversal
The political history made the proposals appear still more extraordinary.
Writing as a lawyer in 1992, Starmer argued that trial by jury helped maintain the balance between state power and individual freedom. His warning was that “the further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance”.
In 2020, when temporary juryless proceedings were discussed during the pandemic, Lammy declared that “criminal trials without juries are a bad idea”. He also argued that juries increased the diversity of those making life changing decisions about guilt.
Those earlier statements were recorded in written evidence submitted to Parliament during scrutiny of the Bill.
Once in government, both men adopted the opposite position. Starmer rejected calls for a reversal, while Lammy introduced legislation making judge only criminal trials a permanent feature of the Crown Court.
The government presented the reform as a practical answer to an emergency. Critics saw a court system damaged by years of underfunding being used to justify concentrating more power in the hands of the state.
The plan may yet be defeated
Starmer is no longer Prime Minister and Lammy has been removed from the Ministry of Justice.
Andy Burnham, who became Prime Minister on 20 July, has indicated that he is considering abandoning the jury restrictions, citing his experience campaigning over the Hillsborough disaster and the dangers of institutional miscarriages of justice.
However, no amendment removing the jury provisions has yet been adopted. The Bill remains at report stage with the contested clauses still present.
A legal analysis of Burnham’s intervention concluded that the position remains unresolved until ministers formally amend or withdraw the relevant provisions.
The Greenstein and Barclays decisions explain why that formal action matters.
One case involved a jury refusing to convict a man for terrorism after hearing the prosecution and defence interpretations of his political speech. The other involved a judge preventing an ordinary criminal damage conviction from being converted into terrorism linked offending after the jury had been discharged.
They were not identical victories, and they do not prove that juries will always acquit political campaigners or that judges will always side with the state. The treatment of the Filton Four demonstrates precisely the opposite.
What these cases establish is the importance of maintaining independent centres of judgment.
Juries bring members of the public into a system otherwise dominated by police, prosecutors, government legislation and professional judges. They compel the state to persuade ordinary citizens beyond reasonable doubt before it can condemn and imprison.
Court delays demand investment in buildings, legal aid, judges, barristers, prosecutors, administrative staff and properly funded sitting days. They do not justify dismantling one of the few institutions capable of placing ordinary people between an accused person and the accumulated power of the state.
The courts backlog was created by political decisions. It should not be repaired by depriving future defendants of the kind of jury that stood between Tony Greenstein and a terrorism conviction.